But despite these apparent benefits for individuals and the overall development of human rights protection in general, British scepticism towards European human rights law may further be fuelled by this unprecedented step in the history of international law. Today human rights in the UK are protected domestically by the Human Rights Act (HRA) 14 which has attracted enormous criticism for giving an expansive effect to both the Convention rights and the ECtHR jurisprudence within UK law. This incorporation of an international human rights treaty into a domestic legal order has been criticized both because it shifts political power from the executive and legislative branches to the judiciary, 15 and because it, allegedly, undermines Parliamentary sovereignty. 16 ECtHR judgments, such as the now (in)famous Prisoner Voting Rights cases, 17 have led to allegations of illegitimate judicial activism on the part of the Strasbourg Court by casting 'its shadow over the HRA' 18 through section 2(1) HRA, obliging the UK courts to 'take into account' any relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence on a particular Convention right.
Scepticism vis-à-vis ECtHR case law, coupled with increasing criticism of European Union law
(most prominently of the division of competences between the EU and the UK, particularly in the field of the free movement of persons and so-called 'social tourism') clearly illustrate why EU accession to the ECHR may not be a very popular step in the UK: From a critical point of view, accession could not only further add delays to litigation by introducing new mechanisms and procedures before the ECtHR, 19 and entangle the UK legal order in a multi-layered labyrinth of European human rights, 20 but also lead to a creeping transformation of both the Convention and Strasbourg's jurisprudence into domestic law through the backdoor of the supremacy of EU law. In the eyes of the sceptics, EU accession to the ECHR could thus result 'in a tighter net forming around UK membership to the Convention creating a Gordian knot from which Britain would struggle to be freed.' 21 In the light of this considerable criticism, this chapter will therefore explore in part II the negative aspect of EU accession to the ECHR, or -in other words -what accession is not about:
it is not about the Member States, but about the European Union itself and its subjection to the external scrutiny of the ECtHR. Moreover it is crucial to note that the UK's membership in both the EU and the ECHR has already changed the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty, and that accession will not further negatively impact on the UK constitutional system. Accordingly, the argument that the European human rights system now encompasses too many layers of protection, would be further complicated by EU accession to the ECHR, will be rebutted.
Subsequently, part III will examine the positive aspects of accession and demonstrate that its advantages outweigh the British fears by far. It will be analysed, especially, how the Member
States might benefit from a -more or less -unified European human rights system in which only disputes between EU Member States might be exempt from Strasbourg's jurisdiction. 22 After accession, sceptics cannot only expect a 'tamer' version of the EU, which will be subject to the external supervision of the ECtHR, but also a 'truthful' hierarchy through the 'unification' of the Member States' international obligations under EU and ECHR law: in contrast to cases such as Bosphorus, 23 EU accession to the ECHR will prevent any future normative conflicts between EU law and the ECHR for the Member States, as the last say will in any case rest with the European Court of Human Rights.
II. Tangled Hierarchies? Risk Assessment in the Light of the Status Quo
Before analysing what (negative) impact EU accession to the ECHR may have on the UK, it is necessary to illustrate the legal reasons for the existing British scepticism towards accession, whether accession will in fact add another layer of human rights protection, and thus further complicate the already intricate three-dimensional web of fundamental rights regimes, 25 Prima facie, the same is also true for the ECHR and the EU Treaties, on the basis of which Parliament enacted both the ECA and the HRA and thus gave effect to the law of the EU and the ECHR -nonetheless with certain problems for the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty.
B. UK Membership in the European Union
The ECA which gave effect to EU law within the United Kingdom is of unique interest to constitutional lawyers, as it raises the question whether the principle of supremacy of Union law brought about the end of Parliamentary sovereignty 33 and thus that of the very 'Grundnorm'
of British legislative power. 34 The view that the ECA was conceived as an ordinary statute which was not intended to limit Parliamentary sovereignty 35 Nonetheless there is considerable scepticism vis-à-vis the HRA and Strasbourg's jurisprudence which lies in section 3(1), providing that 'so far as it is possible to do so' legislation 'must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights.'
The main difference between the ECA and the HRA is that Parliamentary Acts in contravention of the HRA are merely subject to a 'declaration of incompatibility' (section 4 HRA) which does not affect the validity, application, or enforcement of the law and accordingly respects There is considerable anxiety that the UK constitutional order will gradually lose full control of the 'domesticated' ECHR, 59 i.e. the HRA and its domestic effects. It is feared that after EU accession the ECHR might assume similar features as EU law, namely direct effect and supremacy. 60 The 'gift' of effective human rights protection under the ECHR is therefore -as in Virgil's words in the title of this section 61 -often seen as a Trojan horse, rampant to prevail over the UK constitution in the disguise of EU law. It is true that, upon accession, the EU will be bound under international law by the Convention. Pursuant to the settled case of the CJEU, the Convention will, as an international agreement entered into by the Union, also form an integral part of the EU legal order. 62 Given its clear and precise provisions which are largely not subject to subsequent implementation measures 63 the Convention will thus -in its manifestation as EU law -also have direct effect in and supremacy over domestic law. 64 Within the scope of application of European Union law, all national courts would become 'human rights courts' under the EU obligation to review domestic law in the light of the ECHR and therefore be obliged to enforce the ECHR within the interpretative boundaries of EU law by, for instance, disapplying contravening national law. 65 The Convention rights would then not flow into the UK legal order through the interpretative filter-mechanism of the HRA, but through the fully opened tap of the ECA. This also implies that under section 3(1) ECA, the last say on this issue would rest with the CJEU which remains the ultimate guardian of Union law, including 'unionized international law'. 66 In the UK, this would extend the powers and responsibilities of the courts, which must, in the case of conflict with domestic law, set contravening law aside under the ECA, and not leave the review of compliance of primary legislation to Parliament. 67 However, things are not as intrusive as they seem at first glance, as the ECHR is already 
i. 'Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes': The ECHR as a Trojan Horse in EU Law

ii. Complicating the Work of National Courts
Even before accession, national courts are often confronted with ambiguity of and the departure from previous jurisprudence by the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts, which may be difficult to absorb into the domestic system. This is the case in particular if the CJEU or the ECtHR misunderstood the domestic law position. 87 As the lynchpins in enforcing both the law of the EU and the Convention, the Member State courts are, to an increasing extent, confronted with two extremely intricate bodies of law which must be implemented on the national level. 88 Besides this already-existing complexity, accession is feared to bring about new procedural relationships and issues, and hitherto unknown dynamics, which could prove detrimental to the effective work of the UK courts and thus the overall protection of human rights. 89 This tangling of hierarchies through such new procedural routes (e.g. by the prior involvement procedure, discussed below) may force individual litigants to incur enormous financial costs and procedural delays, which, at the end of the day, could prove more detrimental than beneficial to the cause of human rights protection. Moreover, whatever one might speculate as to what exact impact accession will have on national courts, it is noteworthy that the Accession Agreement fails to address this issue at all in order to not interfere with the division of competences between the EU and the Member States and thus the autonomy of the Union legal order. This means that domestic judges will have to work out these problems for themselves. 90 The main problem the Member States will face after accession is a scenario in which with the opportunity to interpret EU law before Strasbourg does so, but it will thus also comply with the requirement that local remedies be exhausted before the ECtHR accepts a case (Article 35(1) ECHR). Following Opinion 2/13, the prior involvement procedure must also ensure that it will not be the ECtHR deciding whether the CJEU has already given a ruling on the question at issue in that case, but the competent EU institution, and that the scope of the procedure will not solely be limited to questions of validity of secondary law, but to its interpretation as well.
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A major concern of the domestic courts is lengthy litigation which would be caused by involving three court systems, and the cost of justice being delayed. The UK courts will of course have an interest in having such cases off their dockets as fast as possible, and passing them on to either the ECtHR or the CJEU (although the case will return from the latter court), and not to further increase their workload. Lastly, domestic courts will also struggle with the question of overlapping fundamental rights catalogues and the question when to apply which body of law and the consequences which this will entail. 95 However, none of these concerns is caused or further worsened by accession: firstly, the UK courts already are under the obligation to request a preliminary ruling in cases where Article 267(3) TFEU is applicable, which will prevent the triggering of the prior involvement 91 of the CJEU Rules of Procedure, which allow the Luxembourg Court to give rulings within six to eight months. 96 In comparison with the overall length of proceedings, this rather short period of time appears to be a minimal price to pay for a more effective protection of human rights.
Finally, sceptics must also accept that the combined application of overlapping fundamental rights catalogues is not a new phenomenon brought about by accession: even today, the Member State courts are already confronted with minimally three spheres of human rights protection and must accordingly deal with an intricate system of multilevel human rights protection. So far, the UK courts have fared well in this respect, particularly by interpreting the relevant domestic piece of legislation (the ECA and the HRA) in consistency with the EU Treaties and the Convention. Hence there is no reason why this should change for the worse after accession and the introduction of the prior involvement procedure.
iii. EU Competence Creep, in Particular through Positive Obligations
One of the major reasons for British scepticism towards EU accession to the ECHR lies in the minefield that is the division of competences between the Union and the Member States. The first concern is the EU's potential gain of competences at the expense of the Member States in the course of accession. The second concern is that, subsequently, 
III. Truthful Hierarchies: The Benefits of Accession
After having applied some relieving balm on the sceptics' doubts regarding accession, the present section will now analyse its positive aspects and show that the advantages of accession will outweigh any fears of the Member States by far. Given the absence of a codified UK Constitution, it may be more difficult for the British than for representatives of Continental legal orders to accept that a constitutional debate can result in a single document 116 which unifies and hierarchizes a multitude of legal bodies, such as the ECHR, the EU, and the Member
States. The status quo of these three bodies of law is shaped by a heterarchical plurality of legal systems, where there is no ultimate authority to decide which system would prevail in the case of conflicts, and each system will ultimately resolve such clashes by confirming its own autonomy and supremacy. 117 The advantage of accession is, however, that it will unify the European human rights system and give Strasbourg the last say in matters of human rights, make the EU and its Member States equal partners in proceedings before the ECtHR (which would also prevent future normative conflicts between EU law and the ECHR), and establish clear legal hierarchies, which may ideally simplify the current pluralist status quo of European human rights law.
The following subsections will demonstrate how the Member States, including the UK, will benefit from this unified and hierarchized system.
A. External Scrutiny and the Taming of the Shrew
It is evident that the EUCFR cannot compensate for the added value of an impartial, objective, and external scrutiny by an international court 118 such as the ECtHR. Moreover, accession would also remove the increasing contradiction between the human rights commitments required from future EU Member States and the Union's lack of accountability vis-à-vis the ECtHR. 119 Otherwise, it would remain highly hypocritical to make ratification of the Convention a condition for EU membership, when the Union itself is exempt from Strasbourg's scrutiny. 120 This is all the more important in situations where there is no Member State involvement, but only action by the EU. This presents considerable gaps in the protection by the ECtHR. 121 In the Connolly case, for example, Strasbourg found that the alleged violation was not attributable to any Member State, nor was the EU bound (yet) by the ECHR. 122 A similar gap can be seen in the Biret case in which an importer attempted to claim damages from the Union for an embargo against the importation of US beef, and failed before the CJEU. 123 When the company subsequently claimed an infringement of its procedural rights under Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, because it did not have a chance to directly challenge the relevant EU directives before the CJEU, the ECtHR concluded that these violations related solely to deficits in the judicial protection offered by the European Union and were thus not attributable to the Member States. Due to this lack of jurisdiction ratione personae over the EU, the case was declared inadmissible. 124 Accession will eventually close this gap in the external scrutiny of the ECtHR, as the EU will subsequently be directly responsible in such cases. 125 In this respect, sceptics might dread that the Member States will be subject to new constraints under EU law in relation to the Convention, and that due to the increasingly interwoven European human rights system after accession, it will solely be the CJEU that will take the role of the national courts in the international human rights discourse. Yet it remains nonetheless incorrect to assume that the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts are the only two European courts, to the exclusion of national courts, as both will continue to depend on the support of the Member State courts. 126 After navigating at the fringes of the scope of application 132 But there is no guarantee that the ECtHR will not depart from this presumption in the future, even in a non-accession scenario. In such an event, the UK, or any other Member State, would stand alone in Strasbourg, and would be required to take the entire blame for the implementation of EU law in contravention to the ECHR. After accession, however, both the Member State in question and the Union will have the right to defend their actions as equal partners before the ECtHR.
B. The Co-Respondent Mechanism: Equal Partners in Strasbourg
To the chagrin of many law students, the EU's specific legal status as a non-State entity of quasi-federal character is highly complicated, as the 'federation' (EU) legislates and the 'states' when an EU law provision leaves no discretion to a Member State as to its implementation at the national level) (Article 3(2)).
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It is particularly this latter scenario which is of specific interest to the Member States. In
Opinion 2/13, the CJEU criticized in an overly strict manner that the ECtHR's power to decide on a request from the EU to intervene as co-respondent under Article 3(5) of the Accession Agreement is incompatible with EU law. 136 Luxembourg sees this incompatibility in the ECtHR's right to ask for reasons for the intervention from which it can subsequently deduce that the conditions for the EU's participation in the procedure are met. In carrying out such a review, the ECtHR would be prompted to interfere with the EU's legal autonomy when determining which entity is the correct respondent and how responsibility should be allocated illustrate that this mechanism will be applied only in a limited number of cases. 142 Consequently, in the light of potential normative conflicts where the Member States can only implement EU law by simultaneously violating the ECHR, it is in their own interest that this mechanism will enable the EU as the legislator of secondary law, and thus as the actual 'perpetrator,' to join the proceedings and to share the responsibility for the infringement of Convention rights.
Lastly, the sceptics might interject that the UK would not benefit from the co-respondent mechanism because the EU would be able to refuse to join the proceedings because of its voluntary nature under Article 3(5) of the Accession Agreement. This must be criticized because of its sub-optimal results regarding the efficiency of individual human rights protection. 143 Yet, even though the co-respondent mechanism will be voluntary as a matter of international law, 144 this issue may look differently from the perspective of EU law: the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) obliges both the Union and the Member
States to assist each other in carrying out the tasks which flow from the Treaties. This was also confirmed by the CJEU when it held that the Union has an interest in compliance by both the Union itself and its Member States with the commitments entered into under international agreements. 145 Hence it can be easily argued that the EU would also have an obligation under
The main benefit of accession for the UK would therefore lie in its 'unifying' effect of the Member States' international obligations under both EU and ECHR law: in contrast to cases such as Bosphorus, where the Member States were left no discretion, EU accession to the ECHR will prevent any future normative conflicts for the Member States, as the last say will in any case rest with the ECtHR -which might also lead to a judgment against the European Union, the polity actually responsible for an alleged human rights violation.
C. Truthful Hierarchies Instead of Pluralist Enmeshments
The final argument in favour of accession presented here relates to establishing a genuine and truthful hierarchical system of European human rights protection. The current heterarchically informed pluralist structure of domestic, EU, and international law is practically unable to account for fundamentally hierarchical concepts in non-domestic law, 147 require the respondent party to take general measures in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress the effects. 153 The continuing talk about 'legal', 'constitutional', and 'multilevel constitutionalism' to describe the status quo may seem very appealing in terms of a non-organized spirit of cooperation, judicial dialogue, and avoidance of normative conflicts. In fact, however, these pluralist enmeshments of three legal orders without any clear-cut hierarchy are unable to solve normative conflicts, 154 continuously erode the rule of law and any legal certainty, 155 and merely provide a disaggregating legal patchwork quilt instead of a rational and intelligible unity of law. 156 Furthermore, the desire for legal pluralism on the part of some Member States cannot detract from the fact that national courts are nonetheless already bound by EU fundamental rights and Luxembourg's case law, and, therefore have to give them supremacy in their legal orders. In the case of normative conflicts, they cannot, as a matter of EU law, let their respective constitutional laws prevail without infringing their obligations under international or EU law. 157 Upon accession, the CJEU will find itself in a position similar to that of any Constitutional or Supreme Court of the Member States vis-à-vis Strasbourg, and the EU -in its entirety -will be subordinate to the international legal system of the Convention. 158 In particular the prior involvement procedure under Article 3(6) of the Accession Agreement contains a quasi-federal element by giving the CJEU the opportunity to step in as the Union's 'supreme court' and to guarantee the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. This court-centric approach is by no means pluralist, but rather undoubtedly constitutionalist, 159 and despite the negative outcome of Opinion 2/13, the entire endeavour of accession conveys the overwhelming impression that all judicial and political actors involved are willing to create formal links between the two European institutions rather than perpetuate the current status of informal coordination, non-binding dialogue, and pluralist uncertainty. It is, without doubt, more desirable for the UK to establish an explicitly coherent fundamental rights order than to maintain a system of multiple conflicting orders. With the ECtHR at the apex of the future European human rights edifice, a clear-cut judicial hierarchy will not encroach either upon national or Parliamentary sovereignty, but bring more coherence and legal certainty to fundamental rights protection. 160 Eventually, it seems that accession is a crucial tool in bringing an end to the deficiencies of legal pluralism. Legal pluralists might object that the structure of the post-accession order bears resemblance to Neil MacCormick's pluralism under international law, according to which both the Member States and the European Union both cohere within a common legal universe governed by international law and thus within a monistic framework. 161 legal orders enjoy equal ranks juxtaposed with one another, only subordinated to international law. 162 EU accession to the ECHR should therefore rather be seen as crucial to realize Kelsen's monism of legal hierarchies, which regards international and domestic law as parts of a single unified legal order.
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IV. Conclusions
There are two ways of regarding the European Union's accession to the Convention. One view would be to dread this step as a further encroachment upon the Member States' sovereignty in general and the Parliamentary sovereignty of the UK in particular. However, as Lady Justice
Arden correctly states, we tend to react to certain controversial cases on the European level on an unreflected ad hoc basis instead of thinking in a long-term way about a thriving and beneficial relationship in its entirety 164 One should therefore not jump to any conclusions and not forget another view: namely that the UK became part of the European system of human rights protection at its inception and that EU accession to the ECHR is not about further restricting Member State competences, but about closing the last gap in the already closemeshed web of European human rights law. In fact, if sceptics fear the subversion of the British constitutional order by the EU and the ECHR, then they should accept that this revolution has already happened when the UK became a member of these two supranational systems.
As this chapter has shown, accession does not entail any significant risks for the British constitution: EU accession to the ECHR neither adds another layer of human rights protection, nor does it further complicate the three-dimensional web of fundamental rights regimes.
Moreover, it will not tangle the hierarchies of the dualist UK legal order, which can only give effect to the law of the EU and the ECHR via the enactment of domestic legislation (i.e. the HRA and the ECA), and international law. Hence it does not erode further the sovereignty of Parliament. Accession is about 'taming' the EU and subjecting it to Strasbourg's external scrutiny, and not about further limiting Member State sovereignty. Therefore the Member
States, including the United Kingdom, should welcome accession as a pivotal move in the right direction. Accession does not take away any powers from the Member States; on the contrary, it will remedy the shortcomings of a currently pluralist system by unifying and hierarchizing the European human rights order, and thus strengthen the rule of law and legal certainty for everybody. 162 Neil MacCormick, 'Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe? ' (1998) 
